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INTRODUCTION
Four decades ago, Congress passed the Clean Water Act, the most
important legislation regulating water pollution in United States history.
Surprisingly, attorneys, legal scholars, and judges still grapple with the
level of criminal intent the Clean Water Act requires—the mens rea
requirements—for a person to commit a Clean Water Act crime today.
The prevailing “offense analysis” approach to assess the appropriate mens
rea has produced inconsistent results in different courts for decades.
Congress never considered whether to require proof that the defendant had
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actual knowledge that his or her conduct violated any Clean Water Act
provisions. As a result, courts now use the Clean Water Act’s language to
deal with environmental circumstances and changed prosecutorial
priorities than Congress could never have contemplated when it passed the
Act.
This Article reviews environmental changes since the Clean Water
Act and explains why most mens rea analysis of Clean Water Act crimes
is indeterminate, resulting in federal courts of appeals remaining deeply
and persistently divided on which standard to apply. Over the decades,
case law has expanded—not always consistently—on what constitutes a
public welfare offense. Public welfare offenses have been described as
offenses that impose more stringent duties on those connected with
particular activities that affect public health, safety or welfare, by not
requiring proof of criminal intent for one or more elements of an offense.1
Contrary to its general policies of resolving circuit court splits, the United
States Supreme Court has denied judicial review—certiorari—time and
time again.2
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court continue to decline
certiorari in a select group of important cases where it is unlikely that
Congress and courts would be able to clarify the ambiguity. The Article
suggests a legislative solution to the Clean Water Act’s mental state
requirements. Congress, the political branch, should draft restyled
criminal enforcement provisions that specify mens rea requirements for
each individual element of the offense. It is the role of the legislature, not
courts, to define priorities in enforcing current violations, deterring future
violations, and protecting defendants’ due process rights. This Article
provides a new approach to help Congress achieve these goals. In doing
so, Congress can make a fresh decision on how to balance enforcement
and due process concerns.
I.

40 YEARS OF CLEAN WATER ENFORCEMENT

In 2012, the nation’s environmentalists celebrated the fortieth
anniversary of the Clean Water Act. The Clean Water Act legitimized the
young U.S. environmental movement at a key time in its history and gave

1 See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 323-24 (2003).
2 See United States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 259 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 1600 (2013); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
Hopkins v. United States, 516 U.S. 1072 (1996); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d
1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
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the even younger United States Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) the tools to punish polluters.3
When Congress passed the Clean Water Act, two-thirds of U.S. water
was so fouled by sewage, oil, pesticides and heavy metals that it was
unsafe for swimming or fishing.4 Thirty percent of tap water samples
exceeded federal limits for certain chemicals.5 Eighty-seven percent of
U.S. swordfish samples contained so much mercury they were unfit for
human consumption.6 In response to such findings, Senator Ed Muskie,
the principal Senate sponsor of the 1972 Clean Water Act,7 proclaimed,
“The cancer of water pollution was engendered by our abuse of our lakes,
streams, rivers, and oceans; it has thrived on our half-hearted attempts to
control it; and like any other disease, it can kill us.”8
Over the last forty years, the country has made huge strides in
reducing pollution from wastewater treatment plants and industries.9
Many waterways are no longer dumping grounds for pollutants. Forty
years after passage of the Clean Water Act, sixty-five percent of U.S.
waterways now pass the fishable and swimmable test.10 Now, 90.7 percent
of U.S. community water systems meet “all applicable health-based
standards.”11
Despite the Clean Water Act’s successes, Congress has not amended
the legislation since 1987. As we learn more about how to protect human
health and the environment, circumstances and public norms about the
environment have changed. Because of changed agricultural practices, the
Clean Water Act has become less effective at dealing with runoff from
cities, farms, and other intensive land uses.12 The drafters in the 1970s
were not aware of new chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and hormonedisrupting chemicals like parabens and BPA that can contaminate water.13
Meanwhile, attention has shifted from environmental issues like sewage
and stormwater to fracking, rare earths, and climate change.14 These
3 Russell McLendon, Clean Water Act Is 40 Years Old: Landmark Water Law Hits A
Milestone During Critical Time, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/11/clean-water-act-2012_n_1874980.html.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n. 10 (1980) (referring
to Senator Muskie as the principal Senate sponsor of the Act).
8 118 CONG. REC. 33,692 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, at 16162.
9 McLendon, supra note 3.
10 McLendon, supra note 3.
11 McLendon, supra note 3.
12 McLendon, supra note 3.
13 McLendon, supra note 3.
14 McLendon, supra note 3.
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changed circumstances have made it particularly difficult for modern
courts to interpret Congress’s intent in 1972. As the Clean Water Act
continues to age, courts now use its language to deal with circumstances
that Congress could never have contemplated when it passed the Act.
Over the last few decades, the Supreme Court has frequently refined
its definition of what a public welfare offense entails.15 Examples of
public welfare offenses include sales of adulterated food, sales of
misbranded articles, violations of anti-narcotics acts, criminal nuisances,
violations of traffic regulations or motor-vehicle laws, and violations of
general police regulations passed for safety, health, or wellbeing of the
community.16
In 1971, one year before the Clean Water Act’s passage, the United
States Supreme Court considered in United States v. International
Minerals & Chemical Corp. whether a defendant violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 173.427 by transporting sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids.17 The
former 18 U.S.C. § 834 provided that anyone who “knowingly violates
any such regulation” such as the “transportation of any hazardous
material” pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 173.427 would be fined or imprisoned.18
The Court held that the defendant only needed to know about the
transportation of the sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids to knowingly
violate the statute, not that he was knowingly violating the particular
regulation.19 Specifically, the International Materials Court stated that
where apparently dangerous products are involved, such as sulfuric and
hydrofluosilicic acids, “the probability of regulation is so great that anyone
who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must
be presumed to be aware of the regulation.”20
For thirteen years after Congress passed the Clean Water Act, the
Supreme Court did not consider the implications of the lack of mens rea
requirements on apparently innocent conduct. Finally, in 1985, the Court
in Liparota v. United States analyzed 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1), which
provided that “whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or
possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by
[the statute] or the regulations” would be guilty of a criminal offense.21
The Court held that knowledge of illegality was essential because 7 U.S.C.
15 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994); Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607-09 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433
(1985).
16 Carpenter, supra note 1, at 327.
17 United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 559 (1971).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 564-565.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 420.
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§ 2024(b)(1) could criminalize otherwise innocent conduct such as a food
stamp recipient that “used stamps to purchase food from a store that,
unknown to him, charged higher than normal prices to food stamp program
participants.”22 Nine years later, the Court in Staples v. United States
considered whether a defendant charged under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(6),
which criminalized unregistered firearms such as machine guns, must have
known the firearm in question was an automatic weapon. The Court
focused on the harsh ten-year imprisonment penalty attached to violations
of the statute as a “significant consideration in determining whether the
statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea.”23
Two decades later, the circuit courts finally attempted to interpret
Congressional intent in resolving the Clean Water Act’s ambiguous
mental state requirements.24 As explained in depth below, the federal
circuit courts have applied the factors articulated in International
Minerals, Liparota, and Staples without coming to a definitive conclusion
on whether a Clean Water Act defendant needs to know what substance
was being discharged to commit a Clean Water Act violation. The circuit
courts remain divided on which elements the mental state requirements
apply to.25
After forty-two years, the challenges of interpreting the Clean Water
Act’s mens rea requirements have become enormously complex. There
are too many variables at play, and the legal grounds have shifted
accordingly. Without a reliable answer as to which mens rea requirements
should apply, different interpretations of the Clean Water Act can lead to
different results in its application. For example, the defendant could be
convicted for a felony if she knew that she had discharged a pollutant, or
merely for knowledge that she discharged the substance regardless of
whether she knew that the substance was a pollutant. There is only one
institution that can resolve the inherent ambiguity from the text combined
with four decades of changing environmental, public, and judicial norms.
That institution is Congress.
Section II of this Article explains the confusion that arises from a
linguistic analysis of the mens rea requirements under the Clean Water
Act. Section III turns to circuit court decisions over the past two decades
that addressed the standard required to convict a defendant under the Clean
22

Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. at 425-26.
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607-09 (1994).
24 See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
25 See United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 439 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Hopkins v. United States, 516 U.S. 1072 (1996).
23
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Water Act, and finds courts deeply and persistently divided. Section IV
analyzes why despite the circuit split, the Supreme Court should continue
to deny certiorari, and why Congress should re-draft the Clean Water Act’s
criminal enforcement provisions. Section V provides a framework to
sharpen the issues that Congress should address in drafting new mens rea
requirements for Clean Water Act crimes, and then examines the relevant
policy considerations that Congress should consider, particularly as the
considerations relate to enforcement and due process.
II. LINGUISTIC AMBIGUITY IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT
In drafting the Clean Water Act, Congress used the prevailing
offense analysis approach of understanding mens rea, where each offense
generally only has a single mental state. As a result, linguistic
interpretation does not clarify which elements the mens rea requirements
apply to.
Traditionally, the concurrence of two factors, an actus reus and mens
rea, determine criminal liability.26 Courts presume in most cases that the
defendant must possess a mens rea to commit a crime.27 Mens rea is best
defined in what is known as “element analysis,” as a particular kind of
criminal intent to commit an element of a crime.28 There is no common
principle of universal application to discover the necessary mens rea for
each element, because it is highly contextual.29 Few areas of criminal law
pose more difficulty than determining the proper definition of the mens
rea required for each element of any particular crime.30 Sometimes, it is
difficult to determine what the elements of a particular crime are, in
addition to what mens rea attaches to each of those elements. For example,
burglary requires the intent to commit a felony within a dwelling place at
night.31 This intent, however, could refer to the intent to enter, the intent
to act at night, the intent that the building be a dwelling place, or the intent
to commit a felony within. 32
Under the traditional offense analysis approach of understanding
mens rea, as opposed to the more precise and more modern element
analysis, each offense generally only has a single mental state.33 For
example, under the Clean Water Act, “Any person who knowingly (or
26

United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980).
In re Jorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 301 (Cal. 2000).
28 Paul H. Robinson, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 686-87 (1983).
29 Id. at 687.
30 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403.
31 Robinson, supra note 28, at 688.
32 Robinson, supra note 28, at 688.
33 Robinson, supra note 28, at 688.
27
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negligently) . . . violates [a section] . . . shall be punished.”34 Section
1319(c)(1)(A) only lists one mens rea requirement: “negligently.” Section
1319(c)(2)(A) only lists one mens rea requirement: “knowingly.”
Congress has not defined the adverbs “knowingly” or “negligently”
anywhere in the statute.35 As explained below, an offense analysis
approach, present in the Clean Water Act, creates ambiguity in
enforcement because different mens rea requirements may be intended to
apply to different elements of an offense.
Adding to the confusion of interpreting the Clean Water Act is the
fact that inconsistent interpretations by attorneys, scholars, and even
judges have rendered chaotic most distinctions between different kinds of
culpability.36 Terminology relating to mens rea has been used so many
different ways that they no longer have a set meaning. Scholars continue
to speak of “general intent offenses” and “specific intent offenses.”37 This
is, however, overly simplistic, and may be misinterpreted. General intent
could mean criminal intent.38 General intent could encompass all forms
of the mental state requirement.39 And general intent could also mean
intent to do something on an undetermined occasion.40 Specific intent
could mean the mental state required for a particular crime.41 Specific
intent can mean that only one mental state of intent applies.42 Furthermore,
specific intent could mean intent to do something at a particular time and
place.43 As a result, this Article deliberately uses none of these terms in
discussing the mens rea requirements.
The Clean Water Act has three distinct mens rea requirements:
negligent, knowing, and knowing endangerment.44 The first two of these
are mens rea types recognized in the Model Penal Code—the third,
“knowing endangerment,” is not.45 The Clean Water Act establishes
separate sections for each type of violation.46 The two statutory provisions
that relate to negligent and knowing violations are the focus of the majority
34

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(2).
United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th 1999).
36 Rebecca S. Webber, Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes: What Did
They Know and When Did They Know It?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53, 79 (1988).
37 Robinson, supra note 28, at 688 n.33 (citing examples).
38 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 201-202 (1972)).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(3) (2014).
45 Id.; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
46 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(3) (2014).
35
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of the litigation over mens rea provisions and are the focus of this Article.
Section 1319(c)(1)(A) states the law as it relates to negligence
requirements:
Any person who – (A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312,
1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections
in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the
Administrator or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a
pretreatment program approved under section 1342(a)(3) or
1342(b)(8) of this title or in a permit issued under section 1344 of
this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a State shall be
punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year,
or by both.47

Section 1319(c)(2)(A) states the law as it relates to knowing
requirements:
Any person who – (A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312,
1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections
in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the
Administrator or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a
pretreatment program approved under section 1342(a)(3) or
1342(b)(8) of this title or in a permit issued under section 1344 of
this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a State shall be
punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years,
or by both.48

Each of the individual sections refers to acts and harms, and most
provisions do not explicitly include any mens rea requirements. To
illustrate, § 1311(a) focuses on all effluent limitations:
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.49

Section 1318(b) relates to unlawful disclosures of confidential
information:
. . . Any authorized representative of the Administrator . . . who
knowingly or willfully publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes

47
48
49

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (2014) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1311(a) (emphasis added).
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known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any
information which is required to be considered confidential under
this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both.50

Section 1321(b)(3) refers to unlawful discharge of oil or hazardous
substances into U.S. waters:
The discharge of oil or hazardous substances (i) into or upon the
navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into
or upon the waters of the contiguous zone . . . in such quantities as
may be harmful as determined by the President under paragraph
(4) of this subsection, is prohibited . . . .51

Finally, § 1342(k) concerns the national pollutant discharge
elimination system:
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be
deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of
this title, with sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of this
title, except any standard imposed under section 1317 of this title
for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health.52

For decades, courts have looked at the syntax to determine whether
the mens rea requirement modifies “violates” in the Clean Water Act
statute.53 The phrases “negligently violates” and “knowingly violates”
appear in a different section of the Clean Water Act from the language that
defines the elements of the offenses.54 The “negligently” or “knowingly”
requirement is applied to every offense in sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317,
1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, 1342, and 1345. These sections, which define the
offense elements, list the illegal actions, such as operating a source in
violation of an applicable pretreatment standard,55 the discharge of oil or
hazardous substances into U.S. waters,56 or the disposal of sewage sludge
out of permit conditions.57
In every one of the aforementioned offenses, the mens rea
requirement could be understood linguistically to apply to one, some, or
all of the requisite elements. Each provision’s intent requirement has
several distinguishable parts. For example, in § 1311, the intent
50

Id. § 1318(b) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1321(b)(3) (emphasis added).
52 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2014).
53 See e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1995).
54 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319(c)(1)(3), 1321(b)(3), 1328, 1342,
1345 (2014).
55 Id. §§ 1316(e), 1317(d) (2014).
56 Id. § 1321(b)(3).
57 Id. § 1311(h).
51
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requirement could apply to the intent to discharge a substance, the intent
to discharge a pollutant, the intent to discharge a pollutant out of
compliance, and the intent to specifically violate that section. Because the
offense analysis approach does not recognize the multifaceted nature of
the mental state for each offense,58 it is not viable in understanding which
elements the Clean Water Act mens rea requirement applies to.
Unfortunately, the statutory language has provided no guidance as to
what the intent requirement applies to. For example, the most natural
grammatical reading of § 1319(c)(2)(A) suggests that the adverb
“knowingly” modifies only the verb “violates,” which follows it.59 This
seems to imply that the defendant needs to know that he or she is violating
the law. When Congress uses the language “knowingly violates” or
“negligently violates,” however, the nouns that follow “violates” refer to
section numbers that prescribe very different crimes.60 This could suggest
that the defendant must knowingly violate all the elements of the offenses
prescribed in those section numbers.61
Problematically, either
interpretation would accord with ordinary usage. As a result, the
“negligent” or “knowing” intent in this provision is ambiguous, and
subject to interpretation among prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.
Although legislatures commonly draft ambiguous statutes because
they do not draft in accordance to the clearer Model Penal Code, the Clean
Water Act is unique. Courts often resolve cases of ambiguity through
various forms of statutory construction and legal doctrine. The Clean
Water Act’s ambiguous mens rea requirements, however, are particularly
difficult to interpret because of its complex statute structure and time since
enactment, which has resulted in decades of changed environmental
circumstances and judicial norms.
Realizing that the Clean Water Act inadequately regulated toxic
pollutants, pollution from nonpoint sources, and stormwater discharges,
Congress passed the Water Quality Act of 1987, which amended the
original 1972 Act.62 In 1985, the House Report stated that the proposed
amendments would provide penalties for individuals who “knowingly or
negligently violate or cause the violation” of the Act’s requirements.63 In
1986, the Senate Report spoke of a person who “causes a publicly owned
58

Robinson, supra note 28, at 689.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (2014).
60 See e.g., id. § 1319(c).
61 See United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1996).
62 Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-A-Half Decades of
Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 566 (2005).
63 H.R. REP. NO. 189, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 29–30 (1985); H.R. REP. NO. 1004, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1986).
59
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treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or condition in any
permit issued to the treatment works.”64 Congress’s stated goal was to
increase the criminal penalties to “reflect the commensurately serious
nature of the violations to be criminally prosecuted under the Clean Water
Act.”65
In passing the Amendments, however, Congress made the mens rea
requirements even less clear, using language that may or may not have
eliminated mens rea requirements. Because the lowest mens rea
requirement governs, the word “cause” seems to imply that one or more
elements lacks mens rea requirements, as one could cause a result without
any knowledge. It is unlikely, however, that Congress ever actually
considered whether to require proof that the defendant had actual
knowledge that his or her conduct violated any statutory provisions. The
legislative history and text is silent on whether Congress wanted to
penalize a defendant who simply caused a violation. As a result, the statute
remained ambiguous when the circuit courts began to consider the issue in
the 1990s.
III. AN INDETERMINATE JUDICIAL SPLIT
Courts have had great difficulty with complex statutes in which
Congress has created an offense of “knowingly violating a regulation,”66
such as the Clean Water Act. Without consistent syntax or controlling
legislative history, courts have made rulings based on the more abstract
determination of whether the Clean Water Act constitutes a public welfare
offense statute. Under court doctrine, an offense is a public welfare
offense when Congress intended that one or more elements of an offense
have no mens rea requirement.67 Courts believe Congress intended to
create a public welfare offense when the statute regulates dangerous and
deleterious activities, lacks a mens rea requirement for an element, and
inflicts a light penalty.68 If the Clean Water Act is a public welfare offense
statute, the defendant does not need to know that it was a prohibited act in
order to knowingly violate the Act.69 If the Act is not a public welfare
offense statute, however, the defendant must also know that he discharged
a dangerous and deleterious substance to knowingly violate the Act.70

64

See United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 539 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id.; see also H.R. NO. 1004 at 138.
66 See e.g., United States v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir. 1986).
67 Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes:
The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1210 (1995).
68 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952).
69 See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993).
70 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607, n. 3 (1994)
65
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Statutes are naturally limited by their choice of measures and their
language.71 As a result, there may be several answers to a disputed issue
of law.72 Virtually all canons of statutory interpretation have at least one
counter-canon that could refute it.73 Nonetheless, courts resolve pervasive
ambiguities in statutes, including criminal statutes, all of the time, making
use of various canons and interpretive strategies.74 And once a federal
court of appeals has clearly decided on an interpretation, lower courts
bound by that decision must simply follow it to remain consistent with the
Circuit Court’s ruling.
Since 1993, the federal courts of appeals addressing the Clean Water
Act mens rea requirements have split on whether the Clean Water Act
constitutes a public welfare offense. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits have all stated that the Act is a public welfare statute.75 The
Second, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that the prosecution
only needs to prove that the defendant knew of the prohibited act (the actus
reus) was taking place—but not that the act was in fact prohibited.76 In
contrast, looking at the same statutory language and legislative history, the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits require the government to prove that the
defendant knew what was being discharged to commit a Clean Water Act
violation.77
Because Congress spoke in terms of “causing” a violation, the
Second and Ninth Circuits held that the polluter does not need to be
cognizant of the requirements or even the existence of the permit to violate
the law.78 Both courts implied that following the grammatical rules strictly
would defeat the stated remedial purpose. The Fifth Circuit, however,
declined to characterize the Clean Water Act as a public welfare offense,
stating that Congress remained silent on whether mens rea was required.79
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court to address
the Clean Water Act’s mens rea requirements in United States v.
71 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 5 GREEN BAG 301 (2002).
72 Id. at 298.
73 Id. at 302.
74 Id. at 298.
75 United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 439 n.4 (6th Cir.
1998); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993).
76 E.g. United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715-17 (8th Cir. 1997); Weitzenhoff, 35
F.3d at 1286; Thomas Richard Uiselt, What A Criminal Needs to Know Under Section
309(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act; How Far Does “Knowingly” Travel?, 8 ENVTL. LAW.
303, 311-12 (2002).
77 See United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 666-68 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1996).
78 Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284.
79 Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391.
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Weitzenhoff, in a case involving the discharge of waste activated sludge by
a sewage treatment plant manager.80 The Ninth Circuit held that the sludge
was analogous to the “deleterious devices or obnoxious waste materials”
referenced in International Minerals and therefore, the government did not
need to prove that the defendants knew that their acts violated the statute
to be culpable.81
In 1995, the Second Circuit affirmed Weitezenhoff when it analyzed
the mens rea requirements in United States v. Hopkins, where the
defendant tampered with wastewater samples that would be sent to
independent laboratories for monitoring.82 The Second Circuit cited
International Minerals and stated that the vast majority of the regulated
substances, the need for a governmental permit, and the legislative goal to
strengthen the criminal penalties in the 1987 amendments would alert a
reasonable person to the likelihood of stringent regulation.83 The Second
Circuit specifically noted that the Clean Water Act’s provisions regulate
water quality related effluents,84 toxic pollutants,85 oil and hazardous
substances,86 incinerator residue,87 munitions,88 chemical wastes,89
biological materials,90 and sewage sludge,91 all substances that constitute
dangerous and deleterious substances.92 Both the Ninth and Second
Circuits emphasized that Congress drafted the Act’s criminal provisions
to protect the public from the potentially dire consequences of the Act’s
regulated activities, thus serving a remedial purpose.93 The Second and
Ninth Circuits distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Staples by
contrasting the apparent innocent ownership of guns to the handling of
“obnoxious waste materials.”94
In 1996, however, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ahmad
reached a different conclusion in a case involving the defendant’s
discharge of nearly five thousand gallons of gasoline into a city’s sewer
80

Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1281-82.
Id. at 1284-87.
82 Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 535.
83 Id. at 539.
84 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (2014).
85 Id. § 1317.
86 Id. § 1321.
87 Id. § 1362(6).
88 Id.
89 33 U.S.C. § 1362(4) (2014).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 539 (2d Cir. 1995).
93 Id., 53 F.3d at 540; United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283-86 (9th Cir.
1993), reaffirmed in United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121, cert. denied, Hanousek
v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1102 (2000).
94 Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1280.
81
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system.95 The Fifth Circuit distinguished the case from Weitzenhoff and
Hopkins because the two prior cases dealt with the concept that ignorance
of the law was not an excuse.96 In Ahmad, the Fifth Circuit held that the
discharge of gasoline was no more harmful than the possession of machine
guns in Staples and that the violation, punishable by years in prison, could
not be a public welfare offense because public welfare offenses are
generally punishable only by fines or short jail sentences.97
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that after 1985 that
mens rea requirements apply to each of the statutory elements that
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, especially when Congress is
silent on a mens rea requirement.98 The Clean Water Act regulates rock,
sand, and cellar dirt that are discharged into water, conduct that appears to
be innocent.99 Applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of
construction, the Fifth Circuit stated that because Congress left nondangerous items in the statute, it could not have intended the Clean Water
Act to be a public welfare offense statute.100
The Supreme Court had previously held that when Congress
authorizes a severe penalty for a crime, it tends to suggest that Congress
requires that a defendant must know the facts that make his conduct
illegal.101 In United States v. Weitzenhoff, United States v. Hopkins, and
United States v. Hanousek, the defendants appealed to request the U.S.
Supreme Court to review the decision of the circuit courts through a
petition for a writ of certiorari.102 The Supreme Court, however, denied
certiorari to the Second Circuit’s decision in Hopkins and to the Ninth
Circuit’s decisions in Weitzenhoff and Hanousek,103 in which the Ninth
Circuit had affirmed Weitzenhoff.104 Not all Supreme Court Justices
agreed.105 In Justice Thomas’s dissent to the denial of certiorari which was
joined by Justice O’Connor, he stated that the Clean Water Act could not
be a public welfare offense statute because the Act regulates a broad range
of ordinary and industrial commercial activities and imposes some harsh
penalties.106
95

See United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 390-91.
97 Id. at 391.
98 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985); Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 607-09 (1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994).
99 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6); Mandiberg, supra note 67, at 1219-20.
100 Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391.
101 Staples, 511 U.S. at 618-19.
102 See West’s Tax Law Dictionary § C1070 (2013 ed.).
103 Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1102 (2000).
104 United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999).
105 Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1102 (2000).
106 Id.
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Neither side has the more compelling reasoning based on the
legislative history and the statute. Given these rulings, it is difficult to
predict how the other Circuit Courts would—or should—interpret the
Clean Water Act’s mens rea requirements. In 1991, for example, the Sixth
Circuit held that a Clean Air Act statute that uses the language “knowingly
violates” requires only knowledge of the emissions themselves, not
knowledge of the statute or of the hazards that emissions pose.107 This
holding, however, preceded the Ninth Circuit in Weitzenhoff and did not
refer to the Clean Water Act.
IV. WHY THE SUPREME COURT MUST DENY CERTIORARI
The Supreme Court should continue to deny certiorari on clarifying
the Clean Water Act’s mens rea requirements despite a general rule that
makes circuit splits paradigmatic cases for granting certiorari.108 There
have been dozens of disputes that arise from the Clean Water Act’s unclear
mens rea standards. Congress, however, has given the courts no legal tool
to settle these disputes. The Clean Water Act’s mens rea requirements are
so open-ended in light of the changed circumstances that Congress should
redraft those mens rea requirements. If the Court decided this issue, it
would be no more than a judicial flip of the coin. Although the Supreme
Court should typically review court splits, the Court should not do so when
there is no governing law, and when circumstances have changed
significantly.
In many ways, this is an ideal circumstance for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari. Officially, the Supreme Court Procedures state that the
justices look primarily at the national importance of the question
presented, the potential to resolve a split of opinion in the federal circuit
courts, or the potential for the decision to have important precedential
value.109 The Supreme Court has primarily granted certiorari under three
scenarios. First, when there is an actual conflict between the lower courts
or between the lower court and a Supreme Court precedent.110 Second,
when a lower court decision directly and substantially affects the federal
government, or when the federal government is required to operate
differently in various parts of the country due to decisional conflicts.111
107

United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1991).
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389,
407 (2004).
109 Corey Ciocchetti, The Constitution, the Roberts Court, and Business: The
Significant Business Impact of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court Term, 4 WM. & MARY BUS.
L. REV. 385, 394 (2013)
110 Cordray, supra note 108, at 407.
111 Cordray, supra note 108, at 408.
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Finally, when there are amicus curiae filed in support of or in opposition
to the petition for certiorari;112 non-parties participate in the Court’s
decision-making process through the submission of amicus curiae, or
friend-of-the-court, briefs.113 In regards to the Clean Water Act’s mens
rea requirements, there is an actual conflict between circuit courts.
In particular, lower court and state court conflicts largely guide the
certiorari decisions of the Court. The number of cases involving a conflict
rose from forty-five percent in the mid-1980s to sixty-nine percent in the
mid-1990s and has remained at that level since.114 Under the Supreme
Court Rules, the Supreme Court prioritizes “important” federal questions
on which the lower courts have differed.115 The Court, however, has even
resolved circuit splits on less important matters, like whether a complaint
delivered by facsimile has been properly served.116 As a result, the
scholarly debate on Supreme Court jurisprudence is moving away from
when the justices grant certiorari to when the Justices should grant
certiorari.117
In fact, Justices have significant latitude in granting or denying
certiorari.118 “Because decisionmaking at the certiorari stage is completely
unfettered, the voting behavior of each Justice is constrained only by his
or her own individual sense of what kinds of cases merit the Court’s
attention.”119 Individual justices might be more inclined to grant or deny
certiorari based on their own ideological predilections, and based on the
likely outcome when ruling on the merits.120 Furthermore, the justices’
law clerks, who have some influence with justices but lack a broad outline
of the Court’s trends, typically find a circuit conflict most worthy of
certiorari in a petition for review.121
In Arizona v. Evans, Justice Ginsburg favored a period of diverse and
independent evaluations of a legal issue from different state and federal
appellate courts before a better-informed and more enduring national
112

Cordray, supra note 108, at 408.
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 744 (2000)
114 David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the Supreme
Court Law Clerk by Todd C. Peppers, & Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks
at the United States Supreme Court by Artemus Ward & David L. Weiden, 85 TEX. L. REV.
947, 981-82 (2007) (book review).
115 Cordray, supra note 108, at 436-37.
116 Cordray, supra note 108, at 436-37.
117 See id.; Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (2008).
118 Cordray, supra note 108, at 428.
119 Cordray, supra note 108, at 418.
120 Cordray, supra note 108, at 410-14.
121 ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 132 (2006).
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binding rule from the Supreme Court.122 Justice Stevens concurred, stating
that “[T]here are decisionmakers other than judges who could perform the
task of resolving conflicts on questions of statutory construction.”123
Former Justice O’Connor favorably described a practice of letting issues
‘percolate’ in the fifty states in the interests of federalism, although she
qualified this interest in resolving emerging constitutional issues.124
In contrast, Justice White had an unswerving view that the Court
should not let circuit splits linger, stating that the “Court has a special
obligation to intercede and provide some definitive resolution of the
issues.”125 Former Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred, expressing that
“Congress should not be held to have laid down one rule in North Carolina
and another rule in North Dakota simply because [the lower courts]
disagree with one another on the meaning of a federal statute.”126
Although Justices O’Connor, White, and Rehnquist are no longer on the
Supreme Court today, their views continue to shape the Court. Legal
scholars have not yet considered the circumstances as to when to grant
certiorari when lower courts or state courts are divided, other than the need
to focus on questions of national importance.
This Article suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court decline certiorari
in a narrow set of important cases where Congress and the courts have
been unable to clarify the ambiguity in the first two decades with a
consistent judgment. In those cases, the social circumstances and judicial
norms have substantially changed over the course of two decades and
interpreting the statute becomes especially difficult and complex. To that
end, the Supreme Court should continue to deny certiorari on the Clean
Water Act’s mens rea requirements. As the Clean Water Act continues to
age, courts apply evolved public welfare offense doctrine and new
environmental norms to the Act’s language in ways that Congress likely
never contemplated when it passed the Act in 1972.
The Court cannot come with the “right” analysis for a “better”
answer because legal doctrine and norms have substantially changed.
Congress has not amended the Clean Water Act since 1987, over two and
a half decades ago. Despite the amendments, the Clean Water Act remains
a complex statute with a single mens rea requirement for multiple separate
criminal offenses. Furthermore, the Clean Water Act’s mens rea

122 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24 (1995); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 401
(1985).
123 Cordray, supra note 108, at 439.
124 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 379 (1993).
125 The Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1283, 1285 (2003); see Metheny v. Hamby, 488 U.S. 913, 915 (1988).
126 Cordray, supra note 108, at 436.

344

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 11:327

requirements remain indeterminate despite two decades of decisions, even
though court decisions usually clarify ambiguous statutes over time. The
circuit courts’ decisions could have led to a compelling outcome. The
decisions, however, did not present more clarity on the mens rea
requirements because of shifts in the understanding of what constituted a
public welfare offense.
There are concerns that without uniformity, similarly situated
litigants would be treated differently in different circuits, and that multistate actors, such as corporations, would be forced to comply with
divergent legal standards.127 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court does not
need to resolve circuit splits on the Clean Water Act’s mens rea
requirements when the law is still settled within the circuit. Here, despite
four decades of ambiguity, citizens have clear notice of how mens rea
requirements are applied within the circuits that have decided on the issue.
Instead, Congress should clarify the mens rea requirement so that it
is not a true judicial coin toss. It would be inappropriate for courts to infer
that voters have a preference either way on whether there should be a
specific mens rea requirement to an element of a Clean Water Act offense.
As the moral authority of the country and a political branch that is
accountable to voters, Congress should draft new mens rea requirements
in accordance to a fresh set of policy choices that balance enforcement and
due process concerns.
V. REWRITING THE CLEAN WATER ACT IN LIGHT OF ELEMENT
ANALYSIS
A. Why Element Analysis is Encouraged
The Clean Water Act criminal enforcement sections, more than most
sections, must be rational, clear, and internally consistent, because a
defendant faces possible imprisonment for violating a section. A precise
code that sufficiently defines forbidden conduct gives fair notice, both to
law enforcement and defendants.128 Fair notice provides greater due
process protection for defendants and increased fairness of penalties while
reducing opportunities for arbitrary enforcement.129 At the same time, fair
notice helps achieve the goals of condemning and deterring defendants
from violating the law again.130
To give fair notice of the prohibition’s scope to defendants, Congress
can draft mens rea requirements in terms of each element rather than each
127
128
129
130

Frost, supra note 117, at 1570.
Robinson, supra note 28, at 682.
Webber, supra note 36, at 79–80.
Robinson, supra note 28, at 682.

2015]

Criminal Ambiguity

345

offense, a process known as element analysis.131 Element analysis helps
provide the comprehensiveness, clarity, and precision to give fair notice
of the minimum requirements necessary to commit a Clean Water Act
criminal violation.132 Furthermore, element analysis eliminates the need
for judicial statutory construction that may expand or reduce that scope.133
Under element analysis, Congress would regain authority to define the
criminal liability requirements in the Clean Water Act that it had
previously delegated to the courts.
Distilling the Clean Water Act provisions’ elements using the same
examples as above illustrates why element analysis is appropriate:
Section 1311: (1) Any person who (2) negligently or knowingly
violates (3) this section or any permit condition or limitation (4)
by causing (5) a discharge (6) of any pollutant (7) except in
compliance with the Clean Water Act.
Section 1318: (1) Any person who (2) negligently or knowingly
violates (3) this section (4) by knowingly or willfully (5)
publishing, divulging, disclosing, or make known (6) in any
manner or to any extent (7) not authorized by law (8) any
information (9) which is required to be considered confidential.
Section 1321(b)(3): (1) Any person who (2) negligently or
knowingly violates (3) this section (4) by causing (5) a discharge
(6) of oil or hazardous substances (7) into or upon the navigable
waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon
the waters of the contiguous zone (8) in harmful quantities.
Section 1342: (1) Any person who (2) negligently or knowingly
violates (3) this section (4) by not complying (4) with a permit (5)
issued, (6) except any standard imposed for a toxic pollutant
injurious to human health.

Each offense has several elements that are associated with only one
culpable state of mind, creating a significant amount of confusion.
Congress can refine an understanding of the mens rea requirements by
adding detailed, precise definitions of the required culpable states of mind
to each and every offense element in the Clean Water Act’s criminal
enforcement provisions.

131
132
133

Robinson, supra note 28, at 703.
See Robinson, supra note 28, at 703.
Robinson, supra note 28, at 703.
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B. Recommendations for Mens Rea Under Element Analysis for the
Clean Water Act
Congress should redefine the mens rea requirements in accordance
with the now fifty year old Model Penal Code, using only four mens rea
terms: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. Additional
undefined terms would undercut clarity, consistency, and predictability.134
A person would act “purposely” with respect to a result if his conscious
objective and positive desire is to cause such a result.135 A person would
act “knowingly” with respect to a result if it is not his conscious objective,
but is practically certain that his conduct will cause that result.136
“Purposely” would require that the defendant have a positive desire to
cause the result, well beyond knowledge of a result’s near certainty in
“knowingly.”137 A person would act “recklessly” with respect to a result
if he consciously disregards a substantial risk of harm.138 A person who
“recklessly” acts would be punished for taking risks, not for intentionally
acting even with knowledge of the consequences. A person would act
“negligently” if she is unaware of a substantial risk that she should have
perceived, a gross deviation from the reasonable person’s standard of
care—gross negligence.139 In doing so, Congress should define the four
mens rea terms in the Clean Water Act in a new definitions section, given
the historic confusion of these mens rea terms.
Congress should also redraft the language to express each element of
a Clean Water Act crime in a separate and distinct word. To do so,
Congress will need to break the offense down into its material elements.
Different elements of the same offense often require different culpability
requirements.140 Each mens rea term should be defined in relation to each
objective element of an offense, such as the conduct, the attendant
circumstance, or the result.141 To guard against omissions, Congress can
require a reckless mens rea for elements when it states no culpability
term.142 Congress could exclude simple civil negligence as a mens rea
requirement, given that the criminal negligence standard is already

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
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Robinson, supra note 28, at 706.
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See id. § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Robinson, supra note 28, at 694.
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consistent with the Department of Justice’s Principles of Federal
Prosecution.143
More precisely, Congress should apply mens rea requirements only
to the conduct, rather than to the circumstance or result. Otherwise,
“knowing” conduct may always require that the actor be aware of every
pertinent attendant circumstance of his conduct.144 Congress should define
conduct elements literally to mean a single, actual physical movement of
the actor, instead of combining them with circumstance elements. The
Clean Water Act uses terms that express both conduct and circumstance
elements.
This combination creates ambiguities and undermines
consistency in the Clean Water Act.145 For example, 33 U.S.C. § 1311
says that the “Except as in compliance with . . . various sections . . . the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”146 The verb
“discharge” is used to describe both an act and the result of that act. When
rephrased as “knowingly engaging in conduct in which the person
recklessly releases a pollutant,” for example, it expresses greater clarity.
Congress would not need to articulate any mistake or ignorance
defenses after revising the Clean Water Act’s provisions. Mistake
suggests a wrong belief about a matter under the consideration, while
ignorance implies a lack of knowledge about the matter.147 Under
common law, a defendant may be excused from liability based on a
mistake or ignorance of a fact.148
“Under element analysis, however, determining whether a
reasonable or an unreasonable mistake as to a particular circumstance will
provide a defense requires nothing more than determining what culpable
state of mind is required as to that circumstance element.”149 For example,
any mistake negates purposeful or knowing conduct.150 Both unreasonable
and reasonable mistakes negate reckless conduct; unreasonable mistakes
would be better phrased as reckless mistakes.151 Reasonable mistakes
negate negligent conduct; reasonable mistakes would be better phrased as
negligent mistakes.152 Because the mens rea requirements will be clear for
each element, Congress does not need to articulate mistake defenses.
143 See Samara Johnston, Is Ordinary Negligence Enough to Be Criminal? Reconciling
United States v. Hanousek with the Liability Limitation Provisions of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, 12 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 263, 305 (2000).
144 Robinson, supra note 28, at 722.
145 Robinson, supra note 28, at 709.
146 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2014).
147 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 153 (6th ed. 2012).
148 Id.
149 Robinson, supra note 28, at 726.
150 Robinson, supra note 28, at 728.
151 Robinson, supra note 28, at 728.
152 Robinson, supra note 28, at 728.
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Congress should draft the new Clean Water Act mens rea
requirements to deter past and potential violators. A primary purpose of
the Clean Water Act is to ensure that offenders promptly return to
compliance with the Act.153 A prosecutor, however, may have difficulty
establishing an actor’s requisite mental state to convict him because intent,
often the most difficult element to prove,154 must be shown indirectly from
an actor’s statements and conduct.155 Therefore, Congress should draft
mens rea requirements that are not too cumbersome for prosecutors to
meet.
Tough mens rea requirements convince corporations, which commit
the overwhelming majority of antipollution law violations,156 to act more
responsibly to avoid violating any Clean Water Act provisions.
Companies would find it more difficult to treat criminal prosecutions as a
cost of doing business by putting profits before environmental compliance
and public safety.157 “Corporate officials are more likely to comply with
the law when they fear that they may go to jail if their violations are
discovered.”158 Moreover, tough mens rea requirements warn potential
violators that they may also experience adverse criminal consequences for
noncompliance.
At the same time, however, Congress must also protect the
defendant’s due process rights. Under the Fifth Amendment, “[N]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without, without due
process of law.”159 Because society aims to convict only guilty people, the
new mens rea requirements should still presume a defendant’s innocence.
When a defendant acted reasonably and without any intent to commit a
crime, punishment serves no incapacitation, deterrence, or rehabilitation
function. As a result, Congress should make a distinction between
153 THOMAS F.P. SULLIVAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 299 (Government
Institutes, 19th ed. 2007). The other stated purpose is to minimize negative impacts on
health and the environment.
154 Commonwealth v. Smith, 44 N.E. 503, 504 (Mass. 1896); David E. Filippi,
Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Environmental Enforcers Beware!, 26 Envtl. L. 923, 92425 (1996).
155 Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference Comm. on Jury Instructions, Manual on Jury
Instructions in Fed. Crim. Cases § 4.04, reprinted in 33 F.R.D. 523, 550 (Walter J. La Buy,
Chairman 1963).
156 David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of Criminal
Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1226
(2009); see Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of
the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 50 (2001).
157 Uhlmann, supra note 157, at 1226; see Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The
Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 50 (2001).
158 David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental
Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1443 (2011).
159 U.S. Const. amend. V.
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unwitting conduct and criminally culpable conduct by removing the
possibility of elements lacking any mens rea requirements.
To accommodate all of the aforementioned concerns, a person could
commit a Clean Water Act felony if the person knowingly engages in
conduct in which the person recklessly commits the action leading to
reckless consequences:
Section 1311: A person commits a Clean Water Act felony if the
person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person
recklessly releases a pollutant in violation of permit conditions or
limitations in this Act, and the unlawful substance is recklessly
released into U.S. waters.
Section 1318: A person commits a Clean Water Act felony if the
person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person
recklessly gives confidential information not authorized by law
through publishing, divulging, disclosing, or making known in any
manner or to any extent.
Section 1321(b)(3): A person commits a Clean Water Act felony
if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person
recklessly releases oil or hazardous substances, and the substance
is recklessly discharged into or upon the navigable waters of the
United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of
the contiguous zone in harmful quantities.
Section 1342: A person commits a Clean Water Act felony if the
person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person
recklessly fails to comply with a permit issued, except for any
standard imposed for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health.

This proposal would not require that a defendant have knowledge of
the conduct, circumstance, and the result, which would make enforcement
especially difficult; the defendant need only consciously disregard a
substantial risk of harm. At the same time, defendants only face possible
prison time when they have a “reckless” state of mind as to the
circumstance and result elements, a more forgiving standard than what the
Second and Ninth Circuits currently require. Imprisonment would require
that the person knew that what he or she was doing violated the law but
chose to ignore a substantial and unjustifiable risk. A defendant who made
an honest mistake and did not genuinely realize that their conduct could
cause harm should not be morally culpable under the Clean Water Act.
Meanwhile, a person could commit a Clean Water Act misdemeanor
for a negligent state of mind as to the circumstance and result elements,
rather than a recklessness standard:
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Section 1311: A person commits a Clean Water Act misdemeanor
if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person
negligently releases a pollutant in violation of permit conditions or
limitations in this Act, and the unlawful substance is negligently
released into U.S. waters.
Section 1318: A person commits a Clean Water Act misdemeanor
if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person
negligently gives confidential information not authorized by law
through publishing, divulging, disclosing, or making known in any
manner or to any extent.
Section 1321(b)(3): A person commits a Clean Water Act
misdemeanor if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which
the person negligently releases oil or hazardous substances, and
the substance is negligently discharged into or upon the navigable
waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon
the waters of the contiguous zone in harmful quantities.
Section 1342: A person commits a Clean Water Act misdemeanor
if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person
negligently fails to comply with a permit issued, except for any
standard imposed for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health.

This proposal lowers the mens rea requirement from “reckless” to
“negligent” in regards to the prohibited action when it is a misdemeanor.
Because defendants would only face fines and probation time rather than
possible imprisonment, however, the balance between competing interests
shift towards enforcement, given the Act’s significant regulation of
dangerous and deleterious substances. These mens rea requirements
would be consistent with the idea that defendants only need to know about
the emissions, not knowledge of the statute or the hazards that the
emissions pose.
This proposal remains consistent with Supreme Court decisions
which hold that mens rea requirements should apply to each of the
statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.160
Furthermore, proving that a defendant is grossly negligent is higher than
the current standard that “[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that
a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in the same
situation.”161 Therefore, proving that a defendant grossly deviated from

160

See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 471 (1985).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004). Four Circuit Courts hold that 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) requires only proof of simple negligence for Clean Water Act
negligence violations. See United States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 259 (3d Cir. 2012), cert.
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the reasonable person’s standard of care remains a sufficiently high
standard.
CONCLUSION
The prevailing “offense analysis” approach for analyzing the
appropriate mens rea for Clean Water Act offenses has produced
inconsistent results in different courts for decades. Congress never
considered whether to require proof that the defendant had actual
knowledge that his or her conduct violated any of the statutory provisions.
And in forty years, the focus and priorities of criminal prosecution under
the Clean Water Act have changed, creating circumstances that Congress
could never have contemplated when it passed the Act.
Even as federal courts of appeals remain deeply and persistently
divided on which mens rea standard to apply, this Article nonetheless
suggests that the Supreme Court continue to decline certiorari. The
Supreme Court should decline certiorari in a narrow set of important cases
where Congress and the courts have been unable to clarify the ambiguity
in the first two decades with a consistent judgment. Instead, Congress
should redraft the mens rea requirements necessary to commit a Clean
Water Act crime. To do so, Congress should not only make the value
judgments, but also implement the clarity of “element analysis” by
attaching a particular mental state to each and every offense element in the
Clean Water Act. It is the role of the legislature, not courts, to define
priorities in enforcing current violations, deterring future violations, and
protecting defendants’ due process rights.
To that end, Congress should use a “knowing” standard for conduct
elements and a “recklessness” standard for circumstance and result
elements for Clean Water Act felonies. The “negligence” standard would
apply for Clean Water Act misdemeanors in terms of circumstance and
result elements. In doing so, Congress can resolve four decades of
confusion.
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